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As someone who has devoted almost all of his professional time 
since September 11, 2001, to challenging the Bush Administration’s 
detention policy, I have watched with some interest as attitudes 
toward that policy have changed. At first, the prevailing sentiment 
seemed to be one of indifference to the policy and hostility to the 
prisoners. Today, however, the policy is a matter of intense public 
debate, and—at least among informed observers—the prisoners are 
viewed with at least something approaching sympathy. In general, I 
view this transformation as a good thing.  
Yet though the indifference is gone, what has taken its place is 
sometimes equally unsatisfying. Discussion about the Administration’s 
detention policy seems to have gotten caught up in the larger swirl of 
partisan rhetoric surrounding the so-called “war on terror”—an 
overheated screed that often substitutes for clear thinking both on the 
political right and left. 
On the left there is an eagerness to engage in a muddy and 
overbroad criticism of the detention policy, which, if you believe all 
that you hear, amounts to a full-throated and deliberate endorsement 
of the most horrific forms of torture. And on the right there is an 
unblinking acceptance of the policy and everything it has involved 
because, after all, the prisoners are dangerous terrorists who certainly 
deserve far worse than they may have received. As an educator, I find 
 
 † This speech was delivered at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law as 
part of the 2006–2007 Public Interest Law Speakers Series. Minimal footnotes have been 
added.  
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the degeneration of this important debate to be exceedingly 
unfortunate, and I hope to skirt past the partisan prattle in this Essay. 
In the pages that follow, I want to do two things. First, I hope to 
describe the Administration’s detention policy in general, and Camp 
Delta in particular, from the Administration’s perspective. I am not 
part of the crowd of people who believe the President should be 
impeached; that members of his Administration should be indicted as 
war criminals; that John Yoo, the author of the infamous “torture 
memo” should be disbarred from the practice of law; and that the 
detention policy is itself an inexplicable assault on the rule of law. 
While I am certainly no defender of the policy (in fact, my colleagues 
and I have fought it tooth and nail for more than six years), I think it 
has a rationale which we must endeavor to understand, because we 
cannot mount a nuanced critique of the policy without first acquiring 
an equally nuanced grasp of its purpose. And second, having 
described what the Administration had in mind with Camp Delta, I 
want to explore some of the assumptions embedded in the 
Administration’s thinking, so that we may discuss whether, in light of 
known facts and subsequent events, those assumptions are valid. 
II. 
Understanding Camp Delta from the Administration’s perspective 
requires that we recognize two things. First, the Administration 
perceives September 11th as fundamentally an intelligence failure. It 
is, they believe, a failure by the global intelligence community, and 
especially the American intelligence agencies, to penetrate al Qaeda, 
identify its plans, and prevent their execution. And in the wake of this 
devastating failure, the Administration came to believe that the most 
important challenge to society was not to prosecute those responsible 
for the last September 11—an essentially retrospective examination 
into culpability for a past event—but to identify, incapacitate, and 
interrogate those who would commit the next September 11—an 
essentially prospective examination into the uncertain world of 
potentialities. Put simply, the Administration views the threat of 
transnational terror as principally an intelligence challenge, and not 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/4
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principally a law enforcement challenge.1 In my estimation, that is 
not an entirely irrational position for a policymaker to adopt. While it 
certainly does not justify all that has happened in the service of this 
position, it is also important that we not confuse ends and means, and 
at least in my opinion, the end of the Administration since 9/11—to 
gather intelligence—is defensible. 
Let us reflect a bit on what it has meant to denominate 9/11 as an 
intelligence challenge. The Administration fervently believes that, to 
prevent the next attack, they need to gather all the information they 
can from whatever source is available, in order that they may divine 
the intentions and plans of what had otherwise proven to be a dark 
and impenetrable foe. The objective, quite simply and again quite 
rationally, is to create what I call information imbalances. The 
Administration wants to know everything about al Qaeda, and wants 
al Qaeda to know nothing about it. Why? Because intelligence is the 
new coin of the realm. If terrorists know what the Administration is 
doing, they are better able to manipulate their actions to avoid 
detection and apprehension. Conversely, if the Administration knows 
everything about would-be terrorists, and they do not know that it has 
this knowledge, it is better able to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately 
defeat their efforts. 
The broader implications of this orientation are beyond the scope 
of this Essay, but it is at least worth recognizing that virtually 
everything we have seen since 9/11 has been done in an attempt to 
create these information imbalances. Consider, for instance, the 
controversial program of secret wire-tapping and electronic 
eavesdropping by the National Security Agency. It is a massive effort 
to vacuum up pieces of information in order to learn otherwise secret 
intentions. It is, in a word, about intelligence. And the reason the 
Administration was so upset when this program came to light is that 
it did not want the people whose communications they were 
monitoring to know what was afoot; such knowledge obviously 
 
 1. Obviously the Administration also recognizes that the attacks of 9/11 were a crime. 
But this does not alter its principle policy objective, which is to gather intelligence about future 
events rather than prosecute offenders for past events. Under no circumstances will the latter be 
allowed to jeopardize the former. This orientation explains the star-crossed attempt to cobble 
together makeshift military commissions, predictably struck down by the Supreme Court. See 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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disrupts the information imbalance. The Administration wants to 
gather as much as it can, and disclose as little as it must. Again, I find 
this a perfectly rational judgment, subject to the above caveats about 
ends and means, though I would certainly not want anyone to get the 
mistaken impression that I am a supporter of the NSA program. 
Of course, one source of information in any intelligence gathering 
effort is what the military calls, “Human Intelligence,” or HUMINT. 
It is that which is gathered from human sources of all kinds, 
including captured prisoners, and is distinguished from “Signals 
Intelligence,” or SIGINT, which is gathered from electronic sources. 
Very soon after 9/11, the Administration recognized that a ground 
war would be part of the retaliatory response to the attacks, and that 
as a consequence, the Administration would soon have in its custody 
people would could, conceivably, possess information about the 
enemy’s present organization and future plans. Almost since time 
immemorial, the interrogation of captured prisoners has been an 
integral part of armed conflict. Very early on, therefore, it was a goal 
of the Administration’s detention policy to extract from prisoners 
every possible jot of information that they might have. And that, in 
turn, leads to the second critical point that must be understood about 
the Administration’s detention policy.  
Shortly after 9/11, the Administration decided to jettison the 
approach to transnational terror taken by prior administrations, which 
conceptualized terror primarily as a crime which should be 
prosecuted using the weaponry of the Nation’s criminal justice 
system. These trials usually took place in the Southern District of 
New York, where a team of prosecutors and FBI Special Agents had 
developed a sophisticated expertise in al Qaeda and had successfully 
brought to justice the perpetrators of both the first World Trade 
Center Bombing in 1993 and the simultaneous bombings of the 
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.  
But to the Administration, the very fact of 9/11 vividly 
demonstrated the limits of the criminal justice orientation. After 9/11, 
the Administration shifted away from this approach, and while they 
did not abandon the criminal justice system entirely, as the 
prosecutions of Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui make clear, 
they nonetheless concluded that the tools available to the criminal 
justice system were ill-suited to the task at hand, and that the threat 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/4
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now facing the United States was better addressed by the combined 
military efforts of the Pentagon and the covert efforts of the CIA. The 
detention policy that developed from this new thinking thus became a 
military and covert response to an intelligence challenge, rather than 
a law enforcement response to a criminal challenge. The two are very 
different. 
Once again, let us reflect on what this shift in orientation has 
meant. Prosecutors understand that, when they prepare a case for 
criminal prosecution, they must develop evidence with an eye to its 
eventual presentation in open court. To that end, a system of rules has 
developed that surrounds the evidence, girding it with a set of 
protections so that when introduced, it will satisfy the rigorous 
demands of a transparent and equitable criminal justice system. That 
is one reason why, for instance, we do not allow certain kinds of 
interrogation methods—because they are an affront to our notions of 
due process.  
But what if you are not seeking criminal prosecutions? If that is 
not your goal, you arguably do not need to restrain interrogations in 
the same way. If your objective is simply to get reliable information, 
then you do not care whether the information you garner would be 
admissible in a court of law. Why? Because you do not intend to use 
that information in court. Obviously a prosecution might take place, 
but the prospect of such a prosecution is merely incidental to, and 
emphatically not the purpose of, the intelligence gathering process.  
Which brings us to this important question: “How, at least 
according to the Administration, should the military and CIA go 
about gathering intelligence from suspected terrorists?” The answer, 
in a word, is Guantánamo. As I have argued elsewhere, Guantánamo 
was designed to be the ideal interrogation chamber.2 And what does 
the ideal interrogation chamber look like in the post-9/11 world? It 
was in its answer to this question that the Administration went 
horribly awry. 
Regrettably, the Administration concluded that, in order to extract 
intelligence from captured prisoners, it needed to create an 
environment unlike anything the U.S. military had been authorized to 
 
 2. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 4 
(2006). 
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create before. The Administration believed it would have in its 
custody a collection of terrorist masterminds, skilled in the art of 
resisting conventional interrogation techniques, and that to overcome 
this resistance, interrogators needed to create an environment of 
complete isolation, absolute terror, and utter despair. They needed to 
imbue a prisoner with a sense of abject hopelessness. They needed to 
make him feel there was no possibility of rescue from the outside 
world, and that as a result he was entirely dependent on his 
interrogators to guarantee his welfare.  
They wanted to trade on his fear and confusion. And they wanted 
to exacerbate that sense of fear by degrading him physically, 
exhausting him, disrupting his sleep cycles, disorienting him with 
hoods and blindfolds, using stress and duress positions or 
screamingly loud cacophonous noise to keep him bewildered, and 
making him stand and sit in awkward and painful positions for 
extended periods of time. This “touchless torture,” which traces its 
origin to the interrogation methods used against roughly three dozen 
U.S. servicemen during the Korean War, had one objective: to create 
an environment that prisoners simply could not tolerate—an 
overpowering and irresistible sensation of total misery. 
Almost everything we have seen at Guantánamo and other DoD 
interrogation facilities, and everything we have learned about what 
took place at the CIA black sites, has been in service of this macabre 
vision of the ideal interrogation. Examples of this are legion, and I 
collect many of the known illustrations in my book. Let me give you 
just one example. In many countries, condemned prisoners wear 
orange uniforms. When they are sentenced to die, they lose the 
uniform they had and are given orange uniforms to signal to all that 
they have been slated for death. I am sure all of you saw the photos of 
the first prisoners arriving at Guantánamo, shackled at the hands, 
waists, and feet, with blackout goggles covering their eyes and ears, 
kneeling on the ground and wearing orange uniforms. Many of the 
prisoners believed they had been brought to this strange place to be 
executed. They were, of course, terrified. 
This quickly became apparent to their interrogators, who 
recognized the horror the prisoners were enduring. A memo later 
surfaced in which an interrogator asked up the chain of command, in 
essence, “The prisoners believe that they are going to be put to death. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/4
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Should we tell them the truth?” In prior military conflicts—at least in 
this Nation’s history—such a question would have been unthinkable. 
Yet in a post-9/11 world, the question not only arose, but received a 
telling response: “No. Do not tell them until we conduct the first 
round of interrogations.” The goal, in other words, both at 
Guantánamo and at DoD and CIA cites all over the world, was a 
deliberate attempt to create an environment of hopelessness, terror 
and despair.3 
III. 
In sum, the Administration’s detention policy emerged from two 
fundamental beliefs: first, that the threat of transnational terror is 
principally an intelligence challenge best met by the military and 
covert machinery of the Pentagon and CIA, rather than the legal 
machinery of the Department of Justice; and second, that effective 
interrogations demanded the creation of an oppressive environment. 
Let us turn now to a discussion of three critical assumptions 
embedded in these beliefs.  
The first, of course, is that an applied program of coercive 
interrogations, coupled with the deliberate creation of oppressive 
conditions, is necessary to extract reliable intelligence. If we accept, 
as I am prepared to do, that 9/11 posed an intelligence challenge, and 
if we accept, as I am prepared to do, that one legitimate objective of 
the ground war was to gather information from captured prisoners, 
then the first assumption we must examine is whether the means 
justified the end—that is, whether it was necessary to create this 
particular environment in order to gather that information.  
 
 3. It should be at once apparent that such a world is wholly incompatible with the 
requirements of the Geneva Conventions. A complete account of the Conventions’ 
requirements in the war on terror is not my purpose in this Essay. As I have argued elsewhere, 
however, the legal decision to jettison the Conventions followed from and was driven by the 
policy decision to create an oppressive interrogation environment. Margulies, supra note 1, at 
11, 44–59. See also DEREK JINKS, THE RULES OF WAR: THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE 
AGE OF TERROR (forthcoming Oxford University Press 2008). Much the same is true for the 
decision to place Camp Delta at Guantánamo Bay, where the Administration believed, 
incorrectly, that it was beyond the reach of the federal courts. Margulies, supra note 1. The 
Administration believed that effective interrogations could only take place if they were beyond 
federal court supervision and intervention. Id.  
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Let me be as clear as I can: there is absolutely no evidence that 
subjecting a prisoner to intolerable conditions will make him more 
apt to disclose truthful information that he would otherwise opt to 
conceal. In fact, there is abundant evidence to the contrary—while 
coercive conditions will undoubtedly increase the amount of 
information given to an interrogator, it is not likely to increase the 
reliability of that information. And that is why so many people within 
the Executive Branch warned the architects of the Administration’s 
detention policy that its policy was bottomed on a fundamental 
misapprehension of the science of interrogation, and that it was 
making a grave mistake by jettisoning the Geneva Conventions and 
embarking on a sustained course of coercive interrogations. 
The FBI, for instance, strongly recommended against the use of 
coercive tactics. The agents assigned to the counterterrorism unit in 
New York had developed an unrivaled body of expertise in the 
interrogation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, whom they had 
successfully interrogated for years. In fact, they had even succeeded 
in turning former members of al Qaeda in government witnesses; the 
first two witnesses in the Embassy Bombing prosecutions were 
former members of al Qaeda. And they strongly recommended 
against the use of coercive interrogations. It is not necessary, they 
warned, nor is it effective as an interrogation tool, nor does it produce 
reliable information. Their advice was rejected as the outmoded 
product of a “law enforcement” conception of transnational 
terrorism..  
But the FBI was not the only group that warned against the 
creation of Camp Delta. So did the military. When General Tommy 
Franks started the ground war in October of 2002, among his 
command decisions was an order that all troops under his command 
must comply with the Geneva Conventions, including the 
Conventions’ prohibitions against coercive interrogation methods. 
Obviously, General Franks knew the asymmetrical nature of the 
conflict. He knew that U.S. troops were going to be capturing people 
who do not wear uniforms, who do not always adhere to the laws of 
war, and who may not, at least by allegation, follow an organized 
command structure. And yet he did not believe it was necessary to 
suspend the protections of the Geneva Conventions and to employ 
coercive interrogation techniques.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/4










2007]  Making Sense of Camp Delta 35 
 
 
The most senior military planners in the Pentagon, including the 
Judge Advocate Generals in every branch of the service, 
recommended against the use of coercive interrogation techniques. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, a career military man and former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended against it as did 
the most senior lawyers in the State Department. All their advice was 
rejected. 
The architects of the Administration’s detention policy, in fact, 
come from a small group of young lawyers, principally in the Office 
of the Vice President, the Office of the White House Counsel, then 
headed by Judge Alberto Gonzales, the Office of Legal Counsel in 
the Justice Department, and a small number of political appointees in 
the Department of Defense. So far as I can ascertain, these people had 
neither law enforcement, nor military, nor intelligence experience. 
Yet they discarded the view of those with the relevant forensic and 
legal experience, trusting instead to their own, unwarranted 
assumptions. History will not be kind to their arrogance. 
The second assumption to the Administration’s detention policy is 
that the people subjected to these aggressive techniques were actually 
a source of intelligence. That is, even if we assume oppressive 
conditions are necessary, it should be immediately obvious that these 
conditions should be confined to those who have intelligence value. 
The immediate question arises, therefore, whether the Administration 
had a sufficiently robust screening system that allowed it to identify 
those who should be subjected to harsh interrogations. 
In fact, as military planners and Administration officials quickly 
learned, no reliable screening existed. According to the Pentagon’s 
data, only five percent of the prisoners at Guantánamo were actually 
captured by the U.S. Military. The remaining ninety-five percent 
were captured by the Northern Alliance, Pakistani Intelligence 
officers or war lords operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan who turned 
them over to the United States, representing them to be members of 
the Taliban or al Qaeda. During 2002 and early 2003, when the 
overwhelming majority of the prisoners at Guantánamo arrived, the 
United States was offering substantial bounties for the capture of al 
Qaeda or Taliban members ($5000 U.S. for every person who was 
reputed to be a member of the Taliban and up to $20,000 for every 
member of al Qaeda). In fact, the military conducted a leafleting 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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campaign, described by Secretary Rumsfeld in a press conference in 
December 2002. He said that the leaflets were falling on Afghanistan 
like snowflakes in Chicago in December. These leaflets promised 
enormous wealth in exchange for members of al Qaeda and the 
Taliban. Of course, the bounty program produced predictable results. 
The Administration now acknowledges that a substantial number of 
people were turned in and shipped to Guantánamo based on false 
representations about their complicity, merely to secure these 
bounties. 
But the bounty system merely exacerbated other difficulties in 
separating wheat from chaff. According to military analysts in 
Afghanistan, literally dozens of prisoners were sent to Cuba against 
the recommendations of interrogators at Afghanistan. Report after 
report identified prisoners as laborers, farmers, shop owners, or taxi 
drivers who had been seized in error and who should be released. But 
there was a lingering uncertainty: perhaps this prisoner, despite all 
available evidence to the contrary, was only masquerading as a taxi 
driver. Perhaps he was really a terrorist mastermind. Only if we turn 
the screws will we learn the truth. And so it was that literally scores 
of innocent prisoners were sent to Guantánamo. 
Among them were a substantial number of juveniles. According to 
the Pentagon, the youngest prisoner to have been at Guantánamo was 
ten years old when he arrived. Another was twelve, a third was 
thirteen. Mercifully, these three children have been released, but a 
number of other prisoners who were children when they were taken 
into custody still remain at the base. All of them came of age in 
Camp Delta. 
At the other extreme, some prisoners were quite old. One was 
eventually tracked down by an energetic reporter for the New York 
Times. He was babbling incoherently, unable to respond to the most 
simple questions. He said he was 105 years old. Another was so old 
that interrogators dubbed him, “Al Qaeda Claus.”  
The former head of interrogations at the base, Major General 
Michael Dunleavy, said some of the prisoners at the base were, in his 
words, “older than dirt,” and that his greatest fear was that a prisoner 
would die of old age. Within weeks of taking over the interrogations, 
he flew to Afghanistan to complain that they are sending too many, in 
his words, “Mickey Mouse” prisoners. 
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One prisoner sent to Guantánamo from Afghanistan had suffered a 
severe head injury, which made him all but unable to respond to 
questions. The interrogators nicknamed him, “Half-head Bob.” He 
was there for nearly a year. 
Let us turn now to the third, and final, assumption. Even if we 
grant that the military needed to create oppressive conditions in order 
to gather intelligence—though they did not—and even if we grant 
that everyone at the base was a proper candidate for these 
conditions—though they were not—then it seems obvious that once 
the interrogations were over, the oppressive conditions would end. 
This would seem to me simply a self-evident moral truth: If a 
prisoner is no longer being interrogated, there is no longer a moral 
justification for keeping him in uniquely severe conditions of 
confinement.  
 And that is why I welcomed the announcement of June 2005 that 
seventy percent of the prisoners at the base were going to be released. 
According to the Pentagon, these prisoners were no longer a threat to 
the United States or a source of intelligence. At roughly the same 
time, the Administration announced that they were no longer 
interrogating the great majority of prisoners at the base. The 
Administration also said that most of the remaining thirty percent 
would be transferred to a new, medium security facility—Camp Six, 
so-called because it would be the sixth unit built at the base. Six was 
specifically intended to improve the prisoners’ quality of life by 
allowing them to eat and sleep in a communal, less restrictive setting.  
 But none of this would ever come to pass. The mass release 
promised in June 2005 never took place, and a year later, in June 
2006, three prisoners committed suicide. They hanged themselves 
with strips of knotted cloth ripped from clothing and bed sheets. Each 
had a ball of cloth stuffed in their mouth, apparently to muffle any 
reflexive choking sounds they may have made as they died. They left 
suicide notes that have never been made public. One of the three 
prisoners, Yasser Talal al-Zahrani from Saudi Arabia, was 21 at the 
time of his death but 17 when he arrived at the base. Another, Mani 
Shaman Al-Utaybi, also from Saudi Arabia, had been designated for 
release. The Pentagon has refused to say whether he knew of his 
pending release when he killed himself. 
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 The Administration quickly announced that the suicides had 
nothing to do with the conditions of confinement. On the contrary, 
Rear Admiral Harry Harris, the base commander at the time, 
denounced the deaths as “an act of asymmetric warfare.” Colonel 
Mike Bumgarner, then commander of the guard force at Camp Delta, 
said the prisoners were “nothing short of a damn animal that can’t be 
trusted” and imposed an immediate crackdown, ordering restrictions 
on prisoner clothing, meals, recreation time, and lighting. 
 Worse, the suicides, along with another disturbance earlier in the 
year, convinced the Pentagon to scrap its plans for the nearly 
completed Camp Six. Instead, Camp Six was retooled into a super-
maximum security compound, more oppressive even than the 
maximum security conditions in use before. Every prisoner at Camp 
Six is in solitary confinement, isolated from all human contact and 
restricted to his small cell 22 hours per day. Space originally reserved 
for exercise yards has been divided into a series of one-man pens. 
Peering out the narrow windows of their computer-controlled cell 
doors, some prisoners in Six can see the stainless steel picnic tables 
that were built to allow inmates to share a meal and conversation, but 
the tables now go unused.  
 In January 2007, in an article marking the fifth anniversary of the 
prison, the Washington Post, citing an Administration official “who 
spoke anonymously to avoid angering superiors,” admitted that only 
half the remaining inmates are believed to represent a threat to the 
United States and that 85 “pose so little threat, they should be 
transferred to their home countries.” Yet they remain, only now they 
are in Camp Six. And, just as it has since the first prisoners arrived in 
Cuba in January 2002, the Administration continues to maintain it 
may hold them in these conditions for the rest of their natural lives. 
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